1. This manual contains operating instructions, maintenance procedures, and troubleshooting procedures for the rifle, 7.62 mm, AK-47. It is divided into five chapters.

2. This manual is written in work package format:

a. Chapters divide the manual into major categories of information (e.g.., General Information, Equipment Description and Data, and Principles of Operation).

b. Each chapter is divided into work packages, which are identified by a 6-digit number (e.g., 0001 00, 0002 00) located at the upper right-hand corner of each page. The work package page number (e.g., 0001 00-1, 0001 00-2) is centered at the bottom of each page.

c. If a change package is issued to this manual, added work packages will use the 5th and 6th digits of their numbers to indicate new material. For instance, work packages inserted between WP 0001 00 and WP 0002 00 are numbered WP 0001 01, WP 0001 02.

3. This manual should be read from beginning to end to become familiar with its organization and contents before you attempt to operate or maintain the equipment.

DESCRIPTION
1. General. The AK-47 rifle is a 7.62 x 39 mm, lightweight, air-cooled, gas-operated, magazine-fed, shoulder-fired weapon which can be selectively fired on the semi-automatic or full automatic settings.

2. Capabilities. Provides personnel the offensive and defensive capability to engage targets with direct small arms fire.

SCOPE

1. Type of Manual. This manual contains operating and maintenance instructions for the 7.62 x 39 mm, AK-47 rifle and its variants.

2. Equipment Name and Model Number. The AK-47 has a fixed stock. The stock and handguards may be made of wood, plastic, or metal. The lower handguard may include a foregrip. The AKS-47 has a folding metal stock.

MAINTENANCE FORMS AND PROCEDURES

The Marine Corps forms and record procedures used for equipment maintenance will be those prescribed in the current edition of TM 4700-15/1_, Ground Equipment Record Procedures.

CORROSION PREVENTION AND CONTROL (CPC)

Corrosion prevention and control (CPC) of weapons material is a continuing concern. While corrosion is typically associated with rusting metal, it can also include the deterioration of other items such as contacts, injection molded plastics, wood, and foam inserts in the case. Unusual cracking, softening, swelling, or breaking of these or other materials may be signs of corrosion.

DESTRUCTION OF MATERIAL TO PREVENT ENEMY USE

To render the equipment useless to the enemy, U.S. Marine Corps personnel shall destroy the equipment by weapons fire, smashing, disassembly, burning, or other means.

END OF WORK PACKAGE

-GENERAL DESCRIPTION

1. The AK-47 rifle is a lightweight, air-cooled, gas-operated, magazine-fed, shoulder-fired weapon that can be selectively fired in the fully or semi-automatic modes.

2. Other features include:
a. Cleaning Rod.

When the UK ceases to be a member of the EU in October 2019 all rights and reciprocal arrangements with the EU end.

The UK reverts fully to ‘third country’ status. The relationship between the UK and the EU as a whole is unsympathetic, with many MS (under pressure from the Commission) unwilling to engage bilaterally and implementing protections unilaterally, though some MS may be more understanding.

No bilateral deals have been concluded with individual member states with the exception of the reciprocal agreement on social security coordination with Ireland. EU Citizens living in the UK can retain broadly all rights and status that they were entitled to prior to exit from the EU, at the point of exit.

Public and business readiness for a no-deal will remain at a low level, and will decrease to lower levels, because the absence of a clear decision on the form of EU Exit (customs union, no deal etc) does not provide a concrete situation for third parties to prepare for. Readiness will be further limited by increasing EU Exit fatigue, due to the second extension of Article 50, which will limit the effective impact of current preparedness communication. [To be reviewed]

Business readiness will not be uniform – in general larger businesses across sectors are more likely to have better developed contingency plans than small and medium sized businesses.

(U//FOUO) Scope. This Reference Aid examines tactics and targets garnered from a review of attacks or disrupted terrorist operations from 2012-2018 linked to either Lebanese Hizballah (LH) or Iran. It identifies behaviors and indicators that may rise to the level for suspicious activity reporting in areas such as recruitment, acquisition of expertise, materiel and weapons storage, target type, and operational security measures, which could assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism agencies, law enforcement officials, and private sector partners in detecting, preventing, preempting, and disrupting potential terrorist activity in the Homeland. This Reference Aid does not imply these indicators would necessarily be observed or detected in every situation or that LH and Iran necessarily use the same tactics or demonstrate the same indicators. Some of these detection opportunities may come during the course of normal investigations into illegal activities in the United States such as illicit travel or smuggling of drugs, weapons, or cash, and lead to the discovery of pre-operational activity. A version of this Reference Aid’s infographic was also included as an appendix to a previously published Intelligence Assessment. Information in this Reference Aid is current as of 16 May 2019.

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Over a number of years, data collected by the FBI’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted {LEOKA} Program began to demonstrate an alarming trend in the number of officers who were killed in ambushes and unprovoked attacks. While the overall number of officers who were feloniously killed was declining, the percentage of officers feloniously killed during surprise attacks was increasing. The LEOKA Program launched a thorough examination of ambushes and unprovoked attacks in an effort to gain insight into the phenomenon and to provide information to enhance training programs for law enforcement officers. The research focused on the mindset and perceptions of officers involved and offenders who carried out those acts. In particular, why the incidents may have occurred and how those involved reacted to the situation.

Researchers selected incidents that met the LEOKA definitions for ambushes and unprovoked attacks, researched those cases, conducted in-depth interviews of officers and offenders involved in those incidents, and methodically analyzed the interview transcripts for useful information. Participants included both law enforcement officers and offenders who willingly agreed to participate. The officers had survived or witnessed an ambush or an unprovoked attack. The offenders had been tried and convicted of engaging in such incidents on one or more law enforcement officers.

Thirty-three officers were interviewed, and researchers identified several topics that officers frequently addressed when discussing the ambushes and unprovoked attacks.

The FBI identified incidents over the past few months in which cyber actors scanned for and sought to exploit audio and visual communication devices on networks to identify vulnerabilities which could later be used to gain access and unlawfully acquire information about the organization. In addition to targeting corporate information, vulnerable devices may be targeted for compromise for use in botnets or other criminal activities. The types of devices targeted include: Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phones, video conferencing equipment, conference phones, VoIP routers, and cloud-based communication systems. While cyber actors have targeted VoIP and other communication devices in the past, the FBI continues to see these devices scanned by cyber actors for vulnerabilities.

Threat

Specifically, the FBI observed cyber actors identifying and probing communication devices by issuing HTTP GET requestsa to a business server or network to retrieve device configuration files. Information contained in configuration files often reveals IP addresses, usernames, passwords, system management URLs, and assigned phone numbers – all of which could be used by cyber actors for malicious purposes. Many of the requests are specific to particular brands of devices. Victims will often receive several GET requests in succession with the actors scanning for multiple brands of devices.

In addition, cyber actors retrieve IP addresses for further exploitation by using businesses’ customer service VoIP hyperlinks, which are traditionally made available for customers to use in contacting the business.