We develop four overarching, global scenarios that feature transformation, collapse, discipline, and continued growth outcomes. These global scenarios do not represent the most probable or likely outcomes—rather, the report harnesses emerging weak signals from environmental scanning analysis (that likely seem improbable today) and weaves them into the possible futures of a post-COVID world.

Global Future #1 (Transformation) – 2035 “From Bio-hegemony to Bio Supremacy:” The new “Great Powers” are those states that have achieved superior levels of bio-resiliency vis-à-vis their peer competitors. National bio-data stockpiles, coupled with a new blend of capabilities in artificial intelligence, satellite-based imagery, and unprecedented global connectivity, have raised the premium on fielding networked military forces. Those states that possess bio-resiliency, along with the capability to instantly make information ubiquitous across their security apparatuses, dominate the new competition.

Global Future #2 (Systemic Collapse) – 2035 “The New Warring States Period:” Scholars label the 2030s as the new “warring states” period—referring both to the ancient Chinese conflict era as well as the outbreak of the 21st century’s first continental-scale civil war in China. This marks China’s second civil war in less than 100 years. The most dramatic factor contributing to this new, global instability is the legitimacy crisis wrought by COVID-19. Additionally, a second legitimacy crisis emerges around the “truth narrative” itself. Industrial scale science and medicine—which had doubled life expectancy and nearly ensured food security in the 20th century—are now widely seen as tools for societal manipulation.

(U) On 26 July 2020, al-Hayat Media Center, a news outlet of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), released an English-language propaganda video entitled “Incite the Believers,” which encourages ISIS supporters to conduct incendiary attacks in the United States. The narrator acknowledges that ISIS supporters may have difficulty traveling to ISIS-controlled territory overseas and instead encourages them to conduct attacks where they live. The video also encourages ISIS supporters who are unable to obtain firearms or explosives to consider using incendiary attacks as an alternative.

(U//FOUO) INCENDIARY ATTACKS LIKELY ENCOURAGED DUE TO THEIR PERCEIVED SIMPLICITY AND OPERATIONAL SECURITY

(U) “Incite the Believers” encourages the use of incendiary attacks as an accessible alternative for those who are unable to obtain firearms, explosives, or other weapons. The narrator describes fire as a simple and historically recognized way to attack enemies, claiming that “even children are proficient in using it. And people have used it since ancient times to harm their enemies.”

(U//FOUO) While the video includes images of “Molotov cocktails,” it does not provide instructions on the manufacture of improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) or recipes for improvised accelerants (such as improvised napalm); but instead focuses on readily available ignition sources such as matches and/or lighters.

• (U//FOUO) While these simple ignition sources are likely to be less effective than IIDs or improvised accelerants, these methods require fewer precursor materials and no chemistry experience, and are likely perceived as a safer option to avoid law enforcement detection.

This document provides guidance for federal Executive Branch departments and agencies regarding best practices, lessons learned, and recommendations to protect against the threat of malicious unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations.

2.0 Background

The development of UAS is a significant technological advance. In addition to recreational and commercial use, unmanned aircraft are used across the United States to support firefighting and search- and-rescue operations, to monitor and assess critical infrastructure, to provide disaster relief by transporting emergency medical supplies to remote locations, and to aid border-security efforts. However, UAS can also be used for malicious schemes by terrorists, criminal organizations (including transnational organizations), and lone actors.

The potential safety hazards and security threats presented by malicious UAS activity in the national airspace system requires security professionals to address the associated risks. Organizations should be aware of the potential exposure of private data through operating UAS. Sensitive data may be at greater risk of exposure when operating UAS designed, manufactured, or supplied abroad where the data is stored, transferred to, or accessible by servers in a foreign country. UAS incorporate technologies that generate or collect sensitive data or otherwise access critical systems.

The ISC details the threat of adversarial use of UAS as an increasing concern in The Design-Basis Threat (DBT) Report. Adversarial uses of UAS include hostile surveillance, smuggling, disruption, and weaponization.

(U//FOUO) This Joint Threat Assessment (JTA) addresses threats to the 59th Presidential Inauguration taking place in Washington, DC, on 20 January 2021. This JTA is co-authored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/US Secret Service (USSS), with input from multiple US Intelligence Community and law enforcement partners. It does not include acts of non – violent civil disobedience (i.e., protests without a permit), which are outside the scope of federal law enforcement jurisdiction.

(U//FOUO) This product is intended to support federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government agencies and authorities in identifying priorities, as well as private sector security partners, for protective measures and support activity regarding terrorism and other existing or emerging threats to homeland security. Information in this assessment is current and accurate as of 14 January 2021.

(U Key Findings

(U//FOUO) As of 14 January 2021, the FBI, DHS, USSS, US Capitol Police (USCP), National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC), Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR), Virginia Fusion Center (VFC) and the Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center (NVRIC), Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia (MPDC), and US Park Police (USPP) assess that domestic violent extremists (DVEs) pose the most likely threat to the 59th Presidential Inauguration in Washington, DC, on 20 January 2021 due to recent incidents of ideologically motivated violence , including at the US Capitol Building.

(U//FOUO)  This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to highlight the threat of violence from domestic violent extremists (DVEs) in the wake of the 6 January violent breach by some DVEs of the US Capitol Building in Washington, DC, following lawful protest activity related to the results of the General Election. Anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists (AGAAVE), specifically militia violent extremists (MVEs); racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs); and DVEs citing partisan political grievances will very likely pose the greatest domestic terrorism threats in 2021. In 2021 , threats and plotting of illegal activity, including destruction of property and violence targeting officials at all levels of the government, law enforcement, journalists, and infrastructure, as well as sporadic violence surrounding lawful protests, rallies, demonstrations, and other gatherings by DVEs will very likely increase due to renewed measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, socio-political conditions, and perceived government overreach. The FBI, DHS, and NCTC advise federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials, and private sector security partners to remain vigilant in light of the persistent threat posed by DVEs and their unpredictable target selection in order to effectively detect. prevent. preempt. or respond to incidents and terrorist attacks in the United States.

(U//FOUO) The 6 January 2021 Violent Breach by DVEs of the US Capitol Building Very Likely Will Serve as an Enduring Driver for Violence by a Range of DVEs

This playbook is intended to support sites interested in administering COVID-19 treatment under EUA including:
• Existing hospital or community-based infusion centers
• Existing clinical space (e.g. urgent care, emergency depts)
• Ad hoc new infusion sites (e.g. “hospitals without walls”)
• Long-term care facilities or home infusions with infusion delivery capability

Initial version of playbook focused on:
• Monoclonal antibody treatment
• Delivery via infusion
• Outpatient setting

This playbook will continue to evolve as other treatments and administration methods become available. We hope this playbook will be used to help healthcare facilities to implement monoclonal antibody treatment in an outpatient setting for those with COVID-19.

The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) sponsored the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) to analyze the phenomenon of Russian private military companies (PMCs), the scenarios under which they would matter to U.S. Army maneuver commanders, and whether they constitute a unique threat to U.S. and partner forces.

The primary audience for this analysis is U.S. Army maneuver commanders and their staffs, but the findings and insights should also be useful for anyone in the U.S. national security and defense communities concerned with asymmetric operations of the Russian Federation around the world. First, this analysis presents key findings from deep-dive research and analysis on Russian PMCs presented in the appendix. It addresses their uses, equipment, training, personnel, state involvement, legal issues, and other related topics. Second, these findings are used to inform an analytical model to explore the operational challenges and considerations Russian PMCs could present to U.S. Army maneuver commanders.

Key Findings

Bottom Line Up Front: Russian PMCs are used as a force multiplier to achieve objectives for both government and Russia-aligned private interests while minimizing both political and military costs. While Moscow continues to see the use of Russian PMCs as beneficial, their use also presents several vulnerabilities that present both operational and strategic risks to Russian Federation objectives.

Friendly Regime Support: Russian lawmakers view Russian PMCs as an instrument to prop up friendly regimes under threat of collapse or ouster.

All forms of voting – in this case mail-in voting – bring a variety of cyber and infrastructure risks. Risks to mail-in voting can be managed through various policies, procedures, and controls.
The outbound and inbound processing of mail-in ballots introduces additional infrastructure and technology, which increases the potential scalability of cyber attacks. Implementation of mail-in voting infrastructure and processes within a compressed timeline may also introduce new risk. To address this risk, election officials should focus on cyber risk management activities, including access controls and authentication best practices when implementing expanded mail-in voting.

Integrity attacks on voter registration data and systems represent a comparatively higher risk in a mail-in voting environment when compared to an in-person voting environment. This is because the voter is not present at the time of casting the ballot and cannot help to answer questions regarding their eligibility or identity verification.

Operational risk management responsibility differs with mail-in voting and in-person voting processes. For mail-in voting, some of the risk under the control of election officials during in-person voting shifts to outside entities, such as ballot printers, mail processing facilities, and the United States Postal Service (USPS).

Physical access at election offices and warehouses represents a risk in a mail-in voting environment. Completed ballots are returned to the election office and must be securely stored for days or weeks before processing through voter authentication and tabulation processes.